This paper presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows agents to enter bilateral alliances and to extract payoffs from enemies. Each pair of agents creates a surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies, then the agent with more allies obtains a larger share of the surplus. I show that Nash equilibria are of two types. First, a state of utopia, where all agents are allies. Second, asymmetric equilibria, such that agents can be partitioned into sets of different size, where agents within the same set are allies and agents in different sets are enemies. These results stand in contrast to coalition formation games in the economics of conflict literature, where stable group structures are generally symmetric. The model provides a game-theoretic foundation for structural balance, a long-standing notion in social psychology, which has been fruitfully applied to the study of alliance formation in international relations. Abstract This paper presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows agents to enter bilateral alliances and to extract payo¤s from enemies. Each pair of agents creates a surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies, then the agent with more allies obtains a larger share of the surplus. I show that Nash equilibria are of two types. First, a state of utopia, where all agents are allies. Second, asymmetric equilibria, such that agents can be partitioned into sets of di¤ erent size, where agents within the same set are allies and agents in di¤erent sets are enemies.
Introduction
In much of the literature on networks, links carry a positive connotation and are commonly interpreted as friendship, collaboration or transmission of information. In many contexts, however, links may also be associated with antagonism, coercion or even outright I am greatful to my supervisors Fernando Vega-Redondo and Massimo Morelli for their invaluable support and guidance. I also thank Matthew O. Jackson, Paolo Pin, Francesco Squintani, participants of the Networks Working Group at the European University Institute, seminar participants at PUC-Rio and participants of the UECE Lisbon Meetings 2010 for helpful comments. All remaining errors are mine. Contact: timo.hiller@eui.eu, Address: Department of Economics, European University Institute, Via della Piazzuola 43, 50133 Florence, Italy 1 con ‡ict. This paper aims at clarifying the interplay between these two forces by way of a game-theoretic model of network formation. The approach is closely related to the notion of structural balance -an intuitive, yet entirely ad-hoc concept in the social psychology literature, which originated in a seminal contribution by Heider (1946) and continues to be an active …eld of study until today.
The advantage of the game-theoretic formulation is twofold. First, it shows how the global network properties, as obtained by structural balance, can be derived in a setting where self-interested individuals form their connections strategically. Second, it allows me to address questions concerning relative size and maximum number of groups, which could previously not be answered. Before proceeding, let me brie ‡y explain the main insights of structural balance.
In its most basic form, structural balance assumes a complete network of positive and negative links, with a positive link denoting alliance or friendship and a negative one denoting antagonism or enmity. The essential idea is that positively connected nodes have a tendency to match their attitudes relative to third nodes, in order to avoid "cognitive dissonance", or psychological stress. A signed graph is said to be balanced, if for each triad, either all three links are positive, or one is positive and two are negative. This leaves two triad con…gurations, which are de…ned as unbalanced. First, two positive and one negative link. Second, the ambiguous case where all three links are negative. The intuition for the …rst case -with two positive and one negative link -to be considered unbalanced, is that the node with the two friendship links will either have to choose sides among his friends due to aforementioned "cognitive dissonance", or otherwise the two enemies will have to make peace. The second con…guration, where all links are negative, is considered unbalanced, because two of the nodes may have incentives to ally and gang up on their common enemy. Cartwright and Harary (1956) showed that these local properties yield sharp predictions globally. In particular, the only two network con…gurations, which are balanced are such that either all nodes are friends, or there exist two distinct sets, also called cliques, where nodes in the same set are friends and nodes in di¤erent sets sustain antagonistic relationships. 1 Arguably, the incentives of two nodes to gang up on a common enemy are signi…cantly lower than those of a node having to choose sides among two of his friends. This view has led to the de…nition of weak structural balance, which assumes triads with only antagonistic relationships among themselves to be balanced (Davis (1967) ). A signed graph is weakly balanced, if (and only if) nodes can be divided into distinct sets, such that any two nodes in the same set are friends, while any two nodes in di¤erent sets are enemies. In terms of its characterization, the di¤erence between weak structural balance and structural balance in its stronger form, is that weak structural balance allows for more than two antagonistic groups. Put succinctly, while under structural balance "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" must hold, weak structural balance postulates the weaker condition that "the friend of my enemy is my enemy". I develop a model of strategic network formation, which picks up on the insights obtained from structural balance and accounts for the interplay between friendship or alliances on the one hand and antagonism or enmity on the other. The setup is simple. Each pair of connected agents creates a unit surplus, which may be interpreted as a trade of money, goods, and services.
Balanced vs. Unbalanced Triads
2 Agents can either extend friendly or antagonistic links, at zero cost. A mutual friendly link creates a friendship or alliance and the surplus is shared in equal parts.
1 I provide a sketch of the proof. A graph with only positive links is balanced. For a graph with positive and negative links, pick an aribitrary node i and devide the remaining set of nodes into i's friends and i's enemies. All of i's friends must be friends, as otherwise one obtains an unbalanced triad with two positive and one negative link. All of i's enemies must be friends, as otherwise one obtains an unbalanced triads with three negative links. Then, links between i's friends and i's enemies must be negative, as otherwise one obtains an unbalanced triad with two negative and one positive link.
2 More generally, exchange can be thought of as a general characteristic of social interaction, which isby and large -based on reciprocation.
If one node extends a friendly link, while the other extends an antagonistic one, then the two nodes enter a coercive relationship and the unit surplus is divided according to a general contest success function. The contest success function is assumed to be strictly increasing in the ratio of a node's respective number of allies. Therefore, under a coercive link, nodes with more allies extract payo¤s in excess of one half from nodes with fewer allies. A mutual antagonistic link translates into a con ‡ictive relationship and the surplus is lost. However, the last assumption is not crucial. In fact, any arbitrarily small amount of cost of con ‡ict and a split of the remaining surplus, as implied by the con ‡ict success function, is su¢ cient for my results to go through. One can then think of the payo¤s resulting from a coercive link as settlement in the shadow of con ‡ict.
The characterization of Nash equilibria mirrors the structural properties obtained in the social psychology literature. Equilibrium con…gurations are such that, either all nodes are friends, or nodes can be divided into distinct sets of di¤erent size, where nodes within the same set are friends and nodes in di¤erent sets sustain coercive relationships. Asymmetry of equilibria is one of the most salient features of the model and at the same time constitutes a departure from previous work on structural balance. Outright con ‡ict is never part of an equilibrium, as payo¤s under coercion are always positive and either con ‡ict party can pro…tably deviate by extending a positive link instead.
The range of sustainable equilibrium con…gurations will depend on the shape of the contest success function, which de…nes the available coercion or war technology -parametrized by . Under a coercive relationship, a low value of is favorable for the node with fewer friends (the potential defender), while a high value of bene…ts the node with the higher number of friends (the potential aggressor). Preliminary results, not yet included in this version of the paper, indicate that, if is su¢ ciently high, then multiple groups of di¤erent size can be sustained in equilibrium. The model predictions therefore coincide with weak structural balance. Furthermore, low values of -a relative advantage for the defender -force the equilibrium into weakly more asymmetric structures. Structural balance theory has become an e¤ective tool for the analysis of alliance formation among states. One of the earliest applications is Harary (1961) , who examines the rapid shifts of relationships among nations concerning the Middle Eastern situation in 1956 and observes a strong tendency towards balance. Moore (1979) also employs structural balance when explaining the "United States's somewhat surprising support of Pakistan ..." after Bangladesh's separation in 1972. Another, particularly interesting example is provided by Antal, Krapivsky and Redner (2006) , who link the formation of alliances in the 19th century -ultimately leading up to WWI -to structural balance. The accompanying graph is depicted above, where alliances are denoted by straight black lines and antagonistic relationships by dashed red lines. Note how the network gradually moves towards a structurally balanced state. A point to be made here is that, although balance appears to be a natural outcome, its implications need not be positive.
Interaction patterns of individuals have, of course, also been examined for structural balance properties. Szell, Lambiotte and Thurner (2010) analyze a vast data-set from a multiplayer online game called Pardus, encompassing more than 300.000 players. The game allows for six types of interactions, of which some have a positive (friendship, communication, trade) and others have a negative association (hostility, aggression, punishment). The authors …nd strong support for structural balance, favoring its weak speci…cation. Further-more, positive links display far higher clustering than negative ones and positive links are highly reciprocal, while negative links are not. This is much in line with the results obtained in this paper. Recent research in sociology has examined the evolution of signed network relations. Doreian and Mrvar (1996) and Doreian and Krackhardt (2001) are two such empirical studies. In both cases a perfectly balanced state is not found, but a movement towards balance is evident.
This paper relates to a strand of the economics literature, which allows for appropriation and con ‡ict, recognizing that property rights may not always be perfectly and costlessly enforced. Con ‡ict is modelled in terms of a contest success function (Tullock (1967 (Tullock ( , 1980 ) and Hirshleifer (1989) ), where an agent's probability of winning is a function of the resources available for arming. Open con ‡ict, however, does not have to take place, and may instead be used as an instrument for bargaining. Part of this research focuses on coalition and group formation among states in the context of distributional con ‡ict (Wärneryd (1998) and Esteban and Sákovics (2003) ). Group structures are, based on the notion of farsighted stability 3 (Chwe (1994) ), shown to be symmetric. Jordan (1996) considers coalitional games, where coalitions with more wealth can pillage the wealth of poorer coalitions at no cost. The farsighted core allocations are again symmetric. These …ndings are in sharp contrast to the results obtained here.
My paper also contributes to the theory of network formation, which has been an active area of research in recent years. See for example Aumann and Myerson (1988) , Bala and Goyal (2000) and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . The so called co-author model in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Chwe (2003) obtain similar results in terms of equilibrium structures. Two recent papers, which also feature con ‡ict success functions in a network setting are Goyal and Virgier (2010) and Franke and Öztürk (2009) , both with a di¤erent focus from mine. Goyal and Virgier (2010) consider a design problem and ask how to optimally structure networks, so that they are robust to attacks in the face of an adversary. Franke and Öztürk (2009) , in turn, model a setting where agents are embedded in a network of bilateral con ‡icts. The authors are concerned with con ‡ict intensity on a …xed network and considerations of link and alliance formation are entirely absent. To the best of my knowledge, the model presented here is the …rst to incorporate friendship (or alliance) and antagonism (or coercion) in a network formation context. The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, Section 3 provides an intuitive account of the main results and Section 4 concludes. All formal proofs are con…ned to the Appendix.
A Simple Model of Friends and Enemies
Let N = (1; 2; :::; n) be the set of ex-ante identical agents, with n 3. A strategy for i 2 N is de…ned as a row vector g i = (g i;1 ; g i;2 ; :::; g i;i 1 ; g i;i+1 ; :::; g i;n ); where g i;j 2 f 1; 1g for each j 2 N n fig : i is said to extend a positive or friendly link to j if g i ; j = 1 and a negative or coercive link if g i ; j = 1. The set of strategies of agent i is de…ned by G i and the strategy space by G = G 1 ::: G n . The resulting network of relationships is written as g = (g 1 ; g 2 ; :::; g n ): De…ne the undirected network g in the following way. The link between node i and j in the undirected network is positive, if both directed links are positive, so that
The link in the undirected network is negative, if one of the two directed links is positive, while the other is negative, so that g i;j = 1 if g i;j g j;i = 1. If both nodes extend a negative link to each other, then no link is established in the undirected network, so that g i;j = 0 if g i;j = g j;i = 1. Given a network g, g + g + i;j and g + g ij have the following interpretation. When g i;j = 1 in g, g + g
De…ne the following sets:
is the set of nodes to which node i has a positive link in the undirected network g:
is the set of nodes to which node i has a negative link in the undirected network g, while
is the set of nodes to which node i has no link in the undirected network g. The corresponding cardinalities are denoted by
the set of nodes with k positive links in the undirected network g.
The payo¤ function i = G ! R + is given by
; with > 0: Links in the undirected network are interpreted in the following way. g i;j = 1 is created by a reciprocated positive link and establishes an alliance or friendship between i and j: The surplus of one is shared in equal parts. g i;j = 1 stems from one friendly and one coercive link and denotes a coercive relationship. Under a coercive link, a node with more allies can extract payo¤s in excess of 1 2 from a node with fewer allies. The exact extraction value is determined by a general contest success function, explained in more detail below. g i;j = 0 results from a mutual coercive link and can be thought of a link of con ‡ict, where no exchange occurs and surplus is lost.
I assume that the coercive strength of node i is determined by
In the presence of a coercive link, the relative shares of the surplus of one -denoted here by p i and p j -are determined by the ratio of i and j's coercive strength. The contest success function is parametrized by , such that
As p i + p j = 1, I can write
; which corresponds to the second term in the payo¤ function i . Note that the contest success function is concave for 0 1 and s-shaped for > 1; with an in ‡ection point at
The equilibrium concept used is Nash Equilibrium. A strategy pro…le g is a Nash Equilibrium (N E) i¤
Throughout the paper, the network after a proposed deviation is denoted with g 0 .
There is one remark I would like to make concerning the assumption that surplus is shared in equal parts under a friendly link. One may object that this split is arbitrary and an alternative model speci…cation could, for example, allow for two di¤erent values of : f for the division of surplus under a friendly link and c for the division of surplus under a coercive link. Preliminary results indicate that making the sensible assumption that c > f , thereby allocating a greater portion of the shared surplus to a friend (as compared to an enemy), is su¢ cient for all my results to hold.
The Friend of My Enemy is My Enemy
The aim of the analysis is to obtain a full characterization of Nash equilibria. This section provides fairly detailed sketches of the proofs, while the formal arguments are relegated to the Appendix. In Lemma 1 I …rst show that outright con ‡ict is never an equilibrium. Lemma 2 then proves that in a coercive relationship, it must always be the node with the higher number of friends extending the negative link. Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 provide existence for my main result in Proposition 3: Nash equilibria are characterized by either a state of utopia, where all nodes are friends, or the undirected network can be partitioned into sets of nodes of di¤erent size, where nodes in the same set are friends and nodes in di¤erent sets sustain coercive relationships. Lemma 3 shows that in any Nash equilibrium, nodes with the same number of friends will also be friends with each other. This observation drives most of the results.
Lemma 1: In any N E g , @ g i;j = 0 for some i; j 2 N:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 states that a con ‡ict link can never be part of a Nash equilibrium. The reason for this is that both nodes involved in the link have an incentive to deviate. By extending a friendly link, both nodes obtain a positive payo¤, compared to a payo¤ of zero under con ‡ict, while payo¤s from links to all other nodes remain the same (the deviation does not alter the total number of friends).
Lemma 2: In any N E g ; if 9i; j 2 N : g i;j = 1 with
In Lemma 2 I prove that in equilibrium, for all competitive links in place in the undirected network, it must be the node with more friends extending the directed antagonistic link. This is easy to see, as otherwise the node with fewer friends can pro…tably deviate by reciprocating the friendly link, thereby increasing his payo¤ from this speci…c link to 1 2 : Moreover, he will increase payo¤s on all his coercive links, while all friendly links continue to yield him a payo¤ of
Proposition 1 shows that a state of utopia, where everyone is friends with everyone, is a Nash equilibrium for any value of . The intuition for this is that no node can unilaterally extract additional payo¤s from nodes, who have the same number of friends prior to a potential deviation.
Proposition 2 provides an existence result for Proposition 3 and states that all nodes being friends with each other, except for one (who in turn is enemies with all remaining nodes), is a Nash equilibrium for any value of . 4 Call the node without friends node k.
There are then at least two other nodes, which I call i and j, who are friends with each other. From Lemma 2 I know that any con…guration where k extends competitive links, while any of the remaining nodes extend friendly ones, can not be a Nash equilibrium. Assume therefore that k extends friendly links to all other nodes. A deviation for node k then consists of substituting a subset of these friendly links for competitive ones. This, however, is not pro…table, as k then receives a payo¤ of zero on the resulting con ‡ict links, while payo¤s from links to all other nodes remain unchanged. For node i, there are three di¤erent types of deviations to be considered and I will show for each of them that no pro…table deviation exists. First, i will not …nd it pro…table to extend a friendly link to k, as he will loose out on his payo¤s in excess of 1 2
, due to
Second, i is not able to extract additional payo¤s by extending competitive links to any subset of N nfi; kg, as then node i will have weakly less friends than any node in N nfi; kg. In fact, any such deviation will strictly decrease i's payo¤s, as i will have less friends after the deviation and can therefore also extract less from node k. Third, a combination of the above two, that is, reciprocating k's positive link and extending one or more negative link(s) to any of the remaining nodes. For n = 3 it is easy to see that there does not exist a pro…table deviation, as payo¤s remain the same. For n 4 payo¤s will strictly decrease. I discern two cases. If the deviation involves only one additional negative link, i's payo¤s decrease, as node k will have less friends prior to the proposed deviation than j after it. If the deviation involves more than one additional negative link, payo¤s will be lower even further, because i can now not only extract less from k, but he will also receive payo¤s of less than 1 2 from all other nodes to which he extends negative links.
Lemma 3: In any N E g , if
Lemma 3 states that, in any Nash equilibrium, nodes who have the same number of friends are also friends with each other. I will use this result extensively for the characterization of equilibrium. Note that Lemma 3 already rules out any con…guration with cliques of equal size as part of a Nash equilibrium. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there are two nodes, i and j, such that they have the same number of friends, but sustain a coercive relationship. Without loss of generality, assume that node i extends the negative link, while node j extends the positive one. I discern 4 cases, which cover all possible networks, each yielding a contradiction with my initial assumption. In the graphs below, black solid lines signify positive, while dashed red lines stand for negative links. The number next to the node indicates the number of friends of that node.
Case 1: The link between i and j is the only negative one in the undirected network, all other links are positive. This can not be an equilibrium, as any node k can pro…tably deviate by extending a negative link to either i or j. Node k will then extort payo¤s in excess of one half from that particular link, while payo¤s on all his other links remain unchanged. Note that in a triad, this is analogous to saying that a con…guration with two positive links and one negative is not balanced.
Case 2: There are at least two competitive links in the undirected network and i and j are only involved in the one between themselves (and have N 2 friends). There are then two nodes, k and l, which are involved in at least one negative link. Therefore, k has at most as many friends as i prior to the deviation and i can pro…tably deviate by extending a positive link to j and a negative one to k. i then extorts payo¤s in excess of 1 2 from k, while payo¤s from all remaining links stay the same. from all other nodes.
Proposition 3: Any N E g s:t: 9s; t 2 N :
Proposition 3 provides a characterization of equilibrium. It states that, in any Nash equilibrium, such that there are at least two nodes with di¤erent numbers of friends, the undirected network can be partitioned into maximal cliques of friends of di¤erent size. Nodes in larger cliques (with more friends), extend negative links to nodes in smaller cliques (with fewer friends).
The proof for Proposition 3 is by induction. First, I rank the sets of nodes with the same number of friends, P k ( g ), by their subscripts, where the subscript stands for the number of friends of a node in that set. I call the set of nodes with the highest number of friends P m ( g ), the set with the second highest number of friends P m 1 ( g ) and proceed in this way until the set of nodes with the lowest number of friends. The idea of the proof is to show that the cardinality j P k ( g ) j= k + 1, which -together with Lemma 3 -already implies the result. Remember that by Lemma 2 all nodes, which are not in P m ( g ), extend positive links to all nodes in P m ( g ). Therefore, the sign of a link in the undirected network g is determined by the sign of the directed link, which the node with more friends extends to the node with fewer friends.
Base Case: In the base case, I prove in four steps that j P m x ( g ) j= x + 1. Step 1: Here I show that in any Nash equilibrium g , any two nodes i; j 2 P m ( g ) must be linked to all other nodes in the same way. That is, all nodes to which i has a friendly link in the undirected network g , j will have a friendly link as well, while all nodes to which i has a antagonistic link in the undirected network g , j will likewise have a antagonistic link. Assume the contrary. As i and j are both in P m ( g ), i and j have the same number of friends,
But then, there must exist a pair of nodes, k and l, such that i has a friendly link with k and an antagonistic one with l, while j has a friendly link with l and an antagonistic one with k: Such a con…guration is depicted in the graph above. Note that k and l are not in P m ( g ), as by Lemma 3 both, i and j, are linked positively to all nodes in P m ( g ): Furthermore, assume w.l.o.g. that l has at least as many friends as k.
This con…guration can not be an equilibrium, as node i can pro…tably deviate by creating a friendly link with l and an antagonistic one with k. i's number of friends remains the same, while k has now strictly less friends than l had before the deviation, i.e.
. Therefore, i can extract more from k than he was previously able to extract from l.
Step 2: I prove that any con…guration, which is not of the following two types, can not be a Nash equilibrium g . First, all nodes i 2 P m ( g ) have positive links with all nodes k 2 P m 1 ( g ) in the undirected network g . Second, all nodes i 2 P m ( g ) have negative links with all nodes k 2 P m 1 ( g ) in the undirected network g . I assume to the contrary that there are positive and negative links between nodes in P m ( g ) and P m 1 ( g ) and discern two cases. First, there does not exist a set P m 2 ( g ): I know from
Step 1 that nodes in P m ( g ) are linked to all remaining nodes in the same way. Assume now, w.l.o.g., that k 2 P m 1 ( g ) is linked positively with all i 2 P m ( g ), while l 2 P m 1 ( g ) is linked negatively with all i 2 P m ( g ) in the undirected network g . This can not be an equilibrium, as from Lemma 3 I know that all nodes in P m 1 ( g ) are connected to each other in a positive way and therefore node k has more friends than node l. But then k and l can not both be in P m 1 ( g ). Second, there exists a set P m 2 ( g ). Recall that any two nodes in P m ( g ) are linked to all remaining nodes in the same way. Assume again that k 2 P m 1 ( g ) is linked positively with all i 2 P m ( g ), while l 2 P m 1 ( g ) is linked negatively with all i 2 P m ( g ) in the 15 undirected network g . But then k is linked positively to all nodes in P m 1 ( g ) and to all nodes in P m ( g ), while for all i 2 P m ( g ) there exists a node l 2 P m 1 ( g ), for which the link in the undirected network g is negative. In order for i 2 P m ( g ) to have more friends than k 2 P m 1 ( g ), there must exist a node h 2 P m x ( g ); with x 2, such that all i 2 P m ( g ) are linked positively to h 2 P m x ( g ), while node k is linked negatively to h 2 P m x ( g ) in the undirected network g . But this can not be a Nash equilibrium, as then i can pro…tably deviate by extending a negative link to h 2 P m x ( g ); with x 2; and a positive one to l 2 P m 1 ( g ). This deviation is pro…table, as h has less friends after the deviation than l had prior to it. Step 3: I show that, if all nodes i 2 P m ( g ) are linked positively to all k 2 P m 1 ( g ), then it must be that the set of friends of node k 2 P m 1 ( g ) are a strict subset of the friends of node i 2 P m ( g ). The underlying argument is very similar to what I already used in the …rst step. First, note that there must exist a node h, which is neither in
such that h is connected positively with all i 2 P m ( g ) and there exists some k 2 P m 1 ( g ), such that h and k are connected negatively in the undirected network g . Otherwise k would have at least as many friends as i, contradicting the assumption that i 2 P m ( g ) and k 2 P m 1 ( g ). Assume now that k's friends are not a strict subset of i's friends. Then there must exist a node l, which is neither in P m ( g ); nor in P m 1 ( g ), such that l is linked negatively with all i 2 P m ( g ) and positively with some node k 2 P m 1 ( g ). This is depicted in the graph above. I can discern two cases. First, h has at most as many friends as l, that is,
Then, i can deviate pro…tably by extending a positive link to l and a negative one to h -the deviation shown in the above graph. If l has at most as many friends as h,
, then node k can deviate pro…tably by extending a friendly link to h and a competitive one to l: Both cases yield a contradiction.
Step 4: I can now at last establish that, in any Nash equilibrium g , links between all i 2 P m ( g ) and all k 2 P m 1 ( g ) must be negative in the undirected network g . Assume the contrary. If there does not exist a set P m 2 ( g ), it is easy to see that the statement must hold, as otherwise i and k would have the same number of friends, i.e.
, yielding an immediate contradiction. For the case where there exists a set P m 2 ( g ), I can distinguish two cases. First, payo¤s of k 2 P m 1 ( g ) are at least as high as payo¤s of
Step 3 that k's friends are a subset of i's friends and consider a deviation where i imitates k's strategy. Under the resulting undirected network after the deviation g 0 , i and j are linked in the same way and i obtains higher payo¤s in g 0 than k did in g . To see this, note that no enemy of k has more friends after the deviation and at least one has fewer friends. Therefore,
Now k can pro…tably deviate by imitating i's strategy and payo¤s of k after the deviation are equal to i's, i.e.
Step 3 -that k's friends are a subset of i's friends -I know that k imitating i's strategy entails linking positively to all nodes to which i is linked positively, while k is linked negatively in g . Then,
k and i are linked in the same way in the undirected network after the deviation g 0 , while all nodes to which i extends antagonistic links have the same number of friends in g and g 0 . Therefore, k's payo¤s after the deviation are equal to i's payo¤s prior to it, resulting in a pro…table deviation. I have now shown that all links between all i 2 P m ( g ) and all k 2 P m 1 ( g ) must be negative. But then, all links between all i 2 P m ( g ) and all h 2 P m x ( g ); for x 2; must be negative as well. Assume the contrary. Then i could pro…tably deviate by extending a positive link to k and a negative one to h: As all nodes in i 2 P m x ( g ) (where the subscript indicates the number of friends of a node in set P m x ( g )) extend negative links to all other nodes k = 2 P m x ( g ), it must be that j P m x ( g ) j= x + 1. This concludes the description of the base case of the proof.
Inductive
Step: For the inductive steps I de…ne the setP r ( g ) = fP m ( g ); P m 1 ( g );
:::; P m r ( g )g, which contains all nodes that have the r + 1 highest number of friends. The base case showed that the statement of Propositions 2 holds forP 0 ( g ) = P m ( g ): In the inductive step I assume that the statement holds for the setP r ( g ) and then show that it must also hold forP r+1 ( g ): Note …rst that, given the statement holds forP r ( g ), all nodes q 2P r ( g ) extend negative links to all nodes z = 2P r ( g ). By Lemma 1 I know that in any Nash equilibrium g ; all z = 2P r ( g ) extend friendly links to q 2P r ( g ): Assuming that the statement holds forP r ( g ), I can then relabel P m ( g ) with P m (r+1) ( g ) and P m 1 ( g ) with P m (r+2) ( g ) and repeat the Steps 1 through 4 from the base case to establish that all links between all h 2 P m (r+1) ( g ) and all z 2 P m (r+2) ( g ) are negative and therefore
( g ) j= y + 1 and above statement holds forP r+1 ( g ). This concludes the equilibrium characterization.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper I present a simple model of network formation, where agents enter into positive (friendship or alliances) and negative (antagonism or coercion) relationships. The coercive power of an agent, relative to another agent, is determined by the ratio of their respective allies. That is to say, an agent with more allies may exploit another agent with fewer allies under a coercive relationship. There are three main insights to be drawn. First, the model shows how in this context self-interested behavior of agents yield the following sharp structural predictions under Nash equilibrium. Either all nodes are friends, or cliques of allies emerge, with antagonistic relationships among distinct cliques. This mirrors results on signed networks obtained in the structural balance literature of social psychology.
Second, cliques are of di¤erent size. This result is interesting, because it constitutes a departure from structural balance, where balanced outcomes allow for cliques of same size. It is also in contrast to models of alliance and group formation in the literature of economics of con ‡ict and coalitional games of pillage, where group structures are shown to be symmetric.
Third, the game theoretic approach allows me to address questions concerning the relative size and number of cliques, which could previously not be answered. A con ‡ict technology, which is favorable for the node with a higher number of allies, permits cliques to be of similar (yet di¤erent) size, while a con ‡ict technology relatively favouring the node with fewer allies, forces equilibrium con…gurations into more asymmetric structures. This paper is the …rst to incorporate friendly and antagonistic links in a game-theoretic model of network formation and there are, of course, many open questions yet to be addressed. It appears natural to add a cost of linking and/or a cost to coercion. Introducing incomplete or asymmetric information seems interesting, as outright con ‡ict may then arise as part of an equilibrium. Furthermore, the so called trade-o¤ between guns vs. butter of the economics of con ‡ict literature is not part of the current speci…cation and one could, for example, allow for investment into production on the one hand and arming (the coercive technology) on the other. A slightly di¤erent model setup, where surplus is not generated by the link, but a resource speci…c to the agent, seems also promising.
Appendix
Proof. Assume there exist two nodes i and j such that g i;j = 0. To see that this can not be a Nash equilibrium, note that i and j obtain a payo¤ of zero from g i;j = 0. But
> 0 for > 0 and i can deviate pro…tably with the following strategy:
Proof. Assume the contrary, i.e. g i;j = 1 with g i;j = 1 and g j;i = 1. But then i can pro…tably deviate with g i + g + i;j , yielding g i;j = 1 in the undirected network. This strictly increases payo¤s for i from his link with j, as
and payo¤s from all k 2 N nfi; jg are non-decreasing in
Proof. A deviation for node i consists of extending negative links to some subset of N nfig: Denote the undirected network after a deviation with g 0 . If the deviation strategy of i consists of extending a negative link to only one other node j, then payo¤s remain the same, as
= N 2 and i and j will continue to share the surplus of one in equal parts. If the deviation strategy of i consists of extending two or more negative links, payo¤s will be strictly lower for i under the deviation, as then
Proof. Recall …rst from Lemma 1 that in any N E g ; @s; t 2 N : g s;t = 0. As above I will check in the following for pro…table deviations. Denote the undirected network after a proposed deviation with g 0 . First, node k. From Lemma 2 I know that, as
2 N nfkg, g k;i = 1 8i 2 N nfkg and a deviation of k therefore consists of extending negative links to some subset of N nfkg. To see that any such deviation decreases k's payo¤s strictly, note that for g k;i = 1 with g k;i = 1, it must be that g i;k = 1: If k were to extend a negative link to i, the undirected link between k and i in g 0 becomes g 0 k;i = 0 and payo¤s for k are zero. Under g k;i = 1, however, payo¤s for k from its link to i are positive, while payo¤s from nodes j 2 N nfk; ig remain the same in both networks, g and g 0 (as i's payo¤s strictly as
, while payo¤s from all other links remain the same. Second, i extends a negative link to some subset of N nfk; ig. This deviation strictly decreases payo¤s: i's payo¤s will decrease from the link with k, as
) and will at most yield constant payo¤s from links with j 2 N nfi; kg, by an argument analogous to Lemma 2. Third, a combination of the above two deviations. Assume …rst i extends a positive link to k and one negative link to some j 2 N nfk; ig. i will not increase payo¤s if n = 3; as then
= 0 and will strictly decrease payo¤s for n 4. To see this, note that then
Furthermore, for n 4, extending more than one negative link to N nfk; ig yields even lower payo¤s than when linking negatively to only one node in N nfk; ig, again by the argument used in Lemma 2.
Q.E.D.
Proof. Assume there exists a Nash equilibrium strategy pro…le g :
Case 1: g i;j = 1^ g i;k = g j;k = g k;l = 1 8k; l 2 N nfi; jg:
This can not be a Nash Equilibrium, as 9k 2 N :
i ( g ) and k can pro…tably deviate with the following strategy g k + g k;i : To see this, note …rst that
and the inequality follows from
Case 2: g i;j = 1^ g i;k = g j;k = 1 8k 2 N nfi; jg^9 g k;l = 1 for some k; l 2 N nfi; jg:
Without loss of generality assume that g i;j = 1 and g j;i = 1: To see that this can not be a Nash Equilibrium, note that if g k;l = 1 for some k; l 2 N nfi; jg, then
But then i can deviate pro…tably with the following strategy g i + g + i;j + g i;k . Denote the undirected network, resulting from the proposed deviation with g 0 : Note that
: Cancelling out terms yields
Note that the only links that di¤er in the undirected network g 0 , relative to g , are g i;j and g i;k : I can therefore write the above condition as
The inequality then holds from
Case 3:
Without loss of generality assume below that g i;j = 1 and g j;i = 1: This can not be a Nash equilibrium, as i can pro…tably deviate with g i + g + i;j : Denote again the undirected network after the deviation with g 0 : Note that
I can then write i (g i + g
which can be rewritten as
can write the above as
and the inequality simply follows from
Case 4: g k;l = 1 8k; l 2 N:
Without loss of generality assume below that g i;j = 1 and g j;i = 1: This can not be a N E, as then node i could pro…tably deviate with the following strategy g i + g + i;j , thereby obtaining payo¤s larger than 1 2 from all nodes k 2 N nfi; jg.
Q:E:D:
The proof is by induction and requires several steps. First, rank the sets P k ( g ) by its subscript and call the set with the highest subscript P m k ( g ) for some k 2 N + , the one with the second highest subscript with P m 1 l ( g ) for some l < k with l; k 2 N + : Proceed in this way until the set with the lowest subscript. For ease of notation, I will drop the subscripts in the following.
Base Case: In any N E g : 9s; t 2 N :
Step 1: I will …rst show that in any N E g : 9s; t 2 N :
For j P m ( g ) j= 1; the statement holds trivially. Assume j P m ( g ) j 2, and -contrary to the above -that 9i; j 2 P m ( g ) :
This con…guration, however, can not be a Nash equilibrium. To see this, take two nodes k and
Note that under the above assumption such a pair of nodes k and l must always exist, as otherwise
Lemma 2 I know that, in order for g to be a Nash equilibrium, g i;l = 1 while g l;i = 1: But then i can pro…tably deviate with the following strategy: g i + g + i;l + g i;k : Call the network after the proposed deviation g 0 : This deviation is pro…table for i, as
, yielding strictly higher payo¤s for i. I know now that
Step 2: I will next show that any con…guration g : 9s; t 2 N :
, which is not one of the following two types, can not be a Nash equilibrium g . First, g i;k = 1 8i 2 P m ( g),
Assume the contrary (and in accordance with
Step 1 ) that 9k 2 P m 1 ( g ) : g k;i = 1 8i 2 P m ( g ) and 9l 2 P m 1 ( g ) : g l;i = 1 8i 2 P m ( g ). I distinguish two cases. First,
Then the contradiction is immediate, as g k;l = 1 8k; l 2 P m 1 ( g ) while g k;i = 1 8i 2 P m ( g ) and g l;i = 1 8i 2 P m ( g ) yields
, resulting in a contradiction. Second, assume 9P m 2 ( g ) and 9k 2 P m 1 ( g ) :
Therefore, in order for
there must exist a node h 2 P m x ( g ) with x 2, such that g i;h = 1: This, however, can not be a Nash equilibrium, as i can then pro…tably deviate with the following strategy: g i + g + i;l + g i;h : Denote again the network after the proposed deviation by g 0 : The deviation is pro…table for node i, as
and it is also pro…table for node l, as
, which is relevant for the Bilateral Equilibrium case): I have so far shown that 8i 2 P m ( g ); either g i;k = 1 8k 2 P m 1 ( g ); or g i;k = 1
Step 3: In any N E g : 9s; t 2 N :
First, note that there must 9h = 2 fP m ( g ); P m 1 ( g )g : g i;h = 1 8i 2 P m ( g )^ g h;k = 1 for some k 2 P m 1 ( g ): For, otherwise,
( g); contradicting the initial assumption that i 2 P m ( g ) and k 2 P m 1 ( g ). Assume now that N + k ( g)nfig N + i ( g)nfkg does not hold. Then there must 9l 2 N : g i;l = 1 8i 2 P m ( g )^ g k;l = 1 for some k 2 P m 1 ( g ):
This, however, can not be a N E. Assume Before proceeding to Step 4, I will de…ne some further sets, which will prove to be useful.
De…nition 2: De…ne the following set(s)Ñ m ( g ) = fk 2 N j N + i ( g ) \ N j ( g ) with i 2 P m ( g ) and j 2 P m 1 ( g )g andÑ m 1 ( g ) = fk 2 N j N + i ( g ) \ N j ( g ) with i 2 P m 1 ( g ) and j 2 P m 2 ( g )g. Proceed in this way until the two sets P ( g ) with the lowest number of allies.
Step 4: I am now in the position to show that in any N E g : 9s; t 2 N : + s ( g) 6 = + t ( g); then g i;k = 1 8i 2 P m ( g ); 8k 2 P m 1 ( g ):
If @P m 2 ( g ), the statement must hold, as otherwise
and contrary to the above statement, but in accordance with the statement in Step 2, that g i;k = 1 for 8i 2 P m ( g ); 8k 2 P m 1 ( g ): I discern two cases. First, k (g ) i (g ) for i 2 P m ( g ); k 2 P m 1 ( g ): Second, i (g ) > k (g ), for i 2 P m ( g ); k 2 P m 1 ( g ):
Case 1: k (g k ; g k ) i (g i ; g i ) for 8i 2 P m ( g ); 8k 2 P m 1 ( g ):
First note that by Step 3, if g i;k = 1 8i 2 P m ( g ); 8k 2 P m 1 ( g ) then the following has to hold N + k ( g)nfig N + i ( g)nfkg 8i 2 P m ( g ) and 8k 2 P m 1 ( g ) (and, conversely, N i ( g ) N k ( g )). Note that i 2 P m ( g ) can then unilaterally imitate the strategy of k 2 P m 1 ( g ) in the following way:
g i;l ; g i )nfkg holds for any pair i 2 P m ( g ); k 2 P m 1 ( g ). Note, however, that i (g i + P l2Ñ ( g )
Case 2: i (g ) > k (g ), for i 2 P m ( g ); k 2 P m 1 ( g ):
From Lemma 2 -together with
m ( g ); 8k 2 P m 1 ( g ) -I know that g h;k = 1 while g k;h = 1: Similarly to Case 1, node k 2 P m 1 ( g ) can therefore unilaterally imitate the strategy of i 2 P m ( g ), such that g h;k = 1 8h 2Ñ m ( g ); 8k 2 P m 1 ( g ). Denote again the undirected network after the deviation with g 0 . To see that i (g ) = k (g 0 ); note that N + k ( g )nfig = N + i ( g 0 )nfkg 8i 2 P m ( g ) and 8k 2 P m 1 ( g ) (and N i ( g ) = N k ( g 0 )).
Therefore, k can pro…tably deviate by extending friendly links to all nodes inÑ m ( g ) and I
have reached a contradiction.
From the above it follows that in any N E g : 9s; t 2 N : + s ( g ) 6 = + t ( g ); then g i;j = 1 8i 2 P m ( g ); 8k 2 P m 1 ( g ): But then g i;v = 1 8v = 2 P m ( g ) and therefore j P m x ( g ) j= x + 1:
De…ne the setP r ( g ) = fP m ( g ); P m 1 ( g ); :::; P m r ( g )g. NoteP 0 ( g ) = P m ( g ):
Inductive
Step: In any N E g , if g i;j = 1 8i; j 2 P m t ( g )^ g i;v = 1 8v = 2 P m t ( g ) holds 8t 2 N : 0 t r; then g h;l = 1 8h; l 2 P m (r+1) ( g )^ g h;w = 1 8w = 2 P m (r+1) ( g ):
In the base case I proved that g i;j = 1 8i; j 2 P m ( g )^ g i;v = 1 8v = 2 P m ( g ), i.e., that the …rst part of the statement holds for r = 0. To prove that this must hold 8P k ( g ); k 2 N + ; I assume the induction hypothesis holds for some r 2 N + and then show that it also holds for r + 1: Note …rst that, assuming the induction hypothesis holds, g q;z = 1 8q 2P r ( g ); 8z = 2P r ( g ): But then I also know that that in any Nash equilibrium g z;q = 1 8q 2P r ( g ); 8z = 2P r ( g ); as @ g i;j = 0. I can therefore repeat steps 1 through 4 from the base step, relabeling P m ( g ) with P m (r+1) ( g ) and P m 1 ( g ) with P m (r+2) ( g ) to establish that g h;l = 1 8h; l 2 P m (r+1) ( g ); g h;z = 1 8z 2 P m (r+2) ( g ) and therefore g h;w = 1 8w = 2 P m r 1 ( g ). I have now shown that the statement holds forP r+1 ( g ), which concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
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